of existing commodity programs--the farmer-owned grain reserve, crop loans, and acreage diversion payments--could be used, if needed, to prevent large drops in crop farmers' incomes.

On the other hand, eliminating deficiency payments would weaken farmers' incentive to participate in cropland set-aside programs, which have helped to stabilize prices and incomes by removing land from use during times of surplus output.

PHASE OUT TOBACCO AND PEANUT PRICE SUPPORT PROGRAMS
(A-350-d)

Savings from CBO Baseline	Annual Savings (millions of dollars) 1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	Cumulative Five-Year Savings
Budget Authority	0	0	0	0	50	50
Outlays	0	0	50	50	50	150

The federal government supports tobacco and peanut prices through the use of acreage allotments and marketing quotas in combination with commodity loans made to farmers. An acreage allotment represents the right to produce and a marketing quota represents the right both to produce and to market. Over time these mechanisms have been used to restrict supply relative to demand to the extent that market prices remained slightly above loan rates. Outlays for these programs are primarily for loans; in 1981, peanut program outlays were about $30 million and the tobacco program showed net receipts from loan repayments of about $50 million.

These programs are, in effect, government-controlled monopolies periodically extended by farmer referendums. The economic benefits of restricted output have been capitalized so that farmers seeking to increase production or obtain entry into the programs must lease or buy the "rights" to produce and market these commodities. Thus these farmers incur substantial costs, while owners of the rights increase their wealth. The costs are ultimately reflected in product prices.

To reduce direct government intervention and eliminate federal outlays, the peanut and tobacco programs could be phased out during fiscal years 1983 and 1984. In place of commodity programs, farmers could be permitted to establish federal marketing orders under federal enabling legislation. This policy would reduce outlays by $150 million during 1985-1987.

Federal marketing orders, issued and supervised by the Secretary of Agriculture, legally obligate first buyers to abide by certain trade practices and restrictions on sales. Marketing orders permit several activities including regulating product flow to market; limiting total quantity to be marketed; prescribing product regulation by size, grade, package, and so forth; providing a means of surplus disposal; checking-off funds for research, promotion, and other activities; and gathering market information. They are not commonly used to restrict production or limit the entry of new farmers. Such actions might be necessary, however, if marketing orders were to provide peanut and tobacco farmers price support similar to that of commodity programs.

Federal marketing orders would entail farmer financing of all costs, except minor federal supervisory expenses. Most likely, funding would come from farmer contributions assessed on each unit of output. While marketing orders would reduce federal intervention and outlays, they would be subject to public scrutiny with respect to their price and supply effects.

ELIMINATE WOOL AND MOHAIR PAYMENT PROGRAM
(A-350-e)

Savings from CBO Baseline	Annual Savings (millions of dollars) 1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	Cumulative Five-Year Savings
Budget Authority	0	43	55	68	74	240
Outlays	43	55	68	74	85	325

The National Wool Act of 1954 authorized payments to farmers on marketings of shorn wool, unshorn lambs, and mohair. Payments are at a rate approximating the difference between the support price established in the law and the national average price received by farmers. The program was enacted as a measure of national security and general economic welfare, because shorn wool was considered an essential and strategic commodity. The objective was to encourage annual domestic production of 300 million pounds of shorn wool.

About $1.3 billion has been paid to farmers since the inception of the program; the amount in 1981 was $36 million. Even so, domestic wool production has declined by more than one-half since 1954 and is now about 100 million pounds a year. The program has clearly not achieved its objectives; it has also been in direct conflict with the reality of declining lamb and mutton consumption and rising use of synthetic fibers. It could be ended without detriment to the nation's supply of food and fiber.

The elimination of program payments would reduce farmers' cash receipts from the marketing of wool and mohair by about a third. Federal payments, however, are only about 10 percent of the total cash receipts that farmers receive from the sale of sheep, lambs, and wool. These payments are made to just 80,000 farmers and average only $400 per farmer. Consequently, the elimination of payments would be of small economic significance to most farmers and would be unlikely to affect measurably the long-term economic viability of the industry.

REDUCE EXTENSION EDUCATION AID TO STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
(A-350-f)

Savings from CBO Baseline	Annual Savings (millions of dollars)					Cumulative Five-Year Savings
	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	
Budget Authority	57	61	65	69	73	325
Outlays	55	58	62	67	71	313

Extension education activities of state and local governments help people identify and solve their farm, home, and community problems through the use of research findings of the Department of Agriculture and state land-grant colleges. The main costs of the program are for the employment of county agents, home economics agents, 4-H Club agents, state and area specialists, and others who conduct joint educational activities. Federal funds--which account for about 40 percent of overall extension financing--are for the most part allocated to the states by prescribed formula. The federal share in 1981 was about $300 million.

Extension education programs once played an important role in the lives of America's farmers. Today's farm families, however, are far better educated, more fully integrated into the nonfarm economy, and obtain technological information from a wider range of sources. Moreover, the programs no longer focus principally on farm families. Although they still include an emphasis on increasing agricultural efficiency, they are now aimed at improving the quality of life for all citizens.

The level of federal support of extension education activities could be reduced without detriment to the farm economy. A 25 percent reduction in the formula funding to states would save about $313 million over the 1983-1987 period. Total overall extension funding would be reduced by about 7 percent, or, on average, around $1 million annually in each state. The reduction would mean that state, county, and local governments would have to increase their share of extension education costs or cut back on such activities.

TERMINATE FEDERAL FUNDING OF FOREIGN MARKET DEVELOPMENT (A-350-g)

Savings from CBO Baseline	Annual Savings (millions of dollars) 1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	Cumulative Five-Year Savings
Budget Authority	25	27	29	31	33	145
Outlays	25	27	29	31	33	145

The federal government provides funding support for overseas agricultural market development projects of 50 cooperators (nonprofit commodity groups), 4 regional groups representing 44 state departments of agriculture, and 38 private business firms. Public financing also supports 47 permanently staffed cooperator offices overseas that conduct promotion activities. The federal government spent $20 million in 1980 supporting such foreign market development activities.

Public financing of private overseas market development activities, which began in 1954, was based on the premise that U.S. producer groups needed federal support in penetrating foreign markets. There is no evidence, however, that public financing of private market development activities has been critical to the expansion of agricultural exports. While in some cases exports may have been boosted, it is not clear that the value of the increased sales exceeded the costs to the taxpayer. Moreover, agricultural products often compete with each other for consumers' expenditures, so that public promotion of one product may work to the disadvantage of others. Cooperators tend to rely on federal funds long after they have become established and experienced in foreign market development. Consequently, as new cooperators seek and receive federal assistance, federal outlays increase annually.

If federal funding of overseas market development was discontinued, outlays would be reduced approximately $145 million during 1983-1987. The burden of foreign market development would be shifted to private groups, which could then assess the costs and benefits of their own projects. Government market development specialists could still continue to provide technical assistance, however.

INCREASE THE SHARE OF INCOME THAT TENANTS OF RURAL HOUSING PROJECTS PAY TOWARD THEIR RENT
(A-370-a)

Savings from CBO Baseline	Annual Savings (millions of dollars) 1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	Cumulative Five-Year Savings
Budget Authority	8	16	26	37	48	135
Outlays	8	16	26	37	48	135

The federal government, through the Farmers Home Administration (FmHA) Section 515 program, subsidizes the shelter costs of low- and moderate-income households renting housing in rural areas. In 1982, the Section 515 program will assist more than 200,000 households--at a cost exceeding $100 million--by financing developers' mortgages at an annual interest rate of 1 percent. FmHA-aided tenants must pay a minimum of 25 percent of their incomes toward their rent, and in some instances they must pay somewhat more. A change in the 25-percent-of-income rule could reduce federal outlays for the Section 515 program. Specifically, if the income share were raised immediately to 30 percent for new tenants and were raised by one percentage point a year, up to 30 percent, for current tenants, an outlay savings of about $135 million could be realized over the 1983-1987 period.

Proponents of this change could view it as equitable, since, in accordance with the reconciliation act of 1981, tenants assisted by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development will be required to pay 30 percent of annual income toward rent by 1986. Critics would argue, however, that the change could create excessive hardship for FmHA-assisted families. Although residency in FmHA housing is restricted to households with incomes below maximums ranging from $17,000 to $23,500, adjusted to reflect prevailing housing costs and household expenses, most tenants actually have incomes considerably below those maximums.

DISCONTINUE DIRECT POSTAL SERVICE SUBSIDIES
(A-370-b)

Savings from CBO Baseline	Annual Savings (millions of dollars) 1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	Cumulative Five-Year Savings
Budget Authority	789	740	804	822	740	3,895
Outlays	789	740	804	822	740	3,895

Under the designation "public service", the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) has used funds appropriated from the U.S. Treasury to subsidize certain operations that are not cost effective, such as postal facilities in remote areas and Saturday mail delivery. Also with Treasury funds, the USPS has subsidized postage for handicapped persons, religious and other not-for-profit organizations, and certain other mailers, including small newspapers; these latter subsidies are termed "revenue forgone." In the 1981 reconciliation act, the Congress cut these subsidies substantially through 1984. Accordingly, the public service subsidy will be phased out, and the revenue forgone payment will be cut by about 12 percent. If, instead, the subsidies were eliminated entirely as of 1983 (except for the subsidy for handicapped mailers, which is estimated to cost $17 million in 1982), the savings through 1987 would amount to $3.9 billion--$0.1 billion from public service provisions and $3.8 billion from revenue forgone.

Eliminating the public service subsidy in 1983 instead of 1984 would necessitate accelerating service reductions, rate increases, or some combination of both. A general postage rate increase of less than 0.5 percent could effectively offset the lost subsidy. Termination of the revenue forgone subsidy--now projected to cost $597 million in 1982--would specifically affect the beneficiaries of this provision, who would lose the privilege of mailing at reduced rates and would have to pay full rates instead. Postage costs for such parties could nearly double during 1983. These increases would be compounded on top of the rate increase that occurred in January 1982 in response to cuts enacted by the reconciliation legislation. (The January increases for typical subsidized mailings ranged from 4 percent to 105 percent.)

The justification advanced for preferential postage rates is that they promote the flow of news and educational, cultural, and charitable materials. With regard to small newspapers, critics argue that the true effect is to subsidize publishers' and advertisers' profits. With regard to not-for-profit organizations--the largest users of reduced rates--critics maintain that the subsidy is poorly targeted, resulting in overuse of mail solicitations, and increases the volume of "junk" mail. Moreover, critics argue that the impact of rate increases on not-for-profit organizations as a group would be small, pointing out that the subsidy may represent less than an estimated 0.2 percent of that group's reported income (based on 1978 data and not including religious groups).

ELIMINATE SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION BUSINESS LOANS AND PROGRAMS
(A-370-c)

Savings from CBO Baseline	Annual Savings (millions of dollars) 1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	Cumulative Five-Year Savings
Budget Authority	260	335	540	675	730	2,540
Outlays	250	320	505	625	675	2,375

The federal government, through the Small Business Administration (SBA), makes direct loans to small businesses that are unable to obtain credit in the private market. The SBA has the authority to make $225 million in new direct loans during fiscal year 1982. If current policy is continued, new SBA loans are projected to total some $230 million in 1983. The actual federal costs of SBA loans are not reflected by the year's budget outlays for loan disbursements, however. Defaults on previous loans and administrative expenses account for the actual costs. For example, the SBA estimates that it will write off about $180 million in fiscal year 1982 for defaults on outstanding direct loans. Thus, of the $225 million in new direct SBA loans issued in fiscal year 1982, an estimated $25 million or more will be lost to SBA over several years as a result of insufficient repayments of principal and interest by loan recipients.

In addition, the SBA guarantees private loans to enterprises not deemed creditworthy by the private credit market. Under CBO's baseline projections, the SBA will have the authority to guarantee $3.0 billion in loans during 1983. This $3.0 billion will have no immediate effect on federal budget outlays, but instead will be reflected in future outlays to cover borrowers' defaults. Default payments for outstanding SBA-guaranteed loans totaled $472 million in fiscal year 1981--appreciably more than the $316 million in direct new loans the SBA issued that year.

Terminating the SBA loan program could yield significant outlay reductions. First, abolishing the direct loans would achieve outlay savings of about $788 million during the 1983-1987 period. Second, if no further loans were guaranteed from 1983 through 1987, outlays for defaults on guaranteed loans would be reduced by about

$1.4 billion. Moreover, additional five-year savings of $180 million could be realized through reduced administrative costs. Together, these actions would produce a total outlay savings of nearly $2.4 billion for the five-year period.

Critics of this proposal see it as having a negative effect on the economy, in that the investment and employment generated by profitable SBA-aided firms would be lost. The Congress targets a substantial amount of SBA lending to groups that traditionally have had difficulty in obtaining loans because of the nature or location of their businesses (notably, energy development, venture firms, and economically deprived areas) or because applicants lack track records (for instance, high-risk entrepreneurs, and minority and handicapped persons).

REDUCE FUNDING FOR AMTRAK
(A-400-a)

Savings from CBO Baseline	Annual Savings (millions of dollars) 1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	Cumulative Five-Year Savings
Budget Authority	255	279	323	350	372	1,579
Outlays	222	237	315	342	363	1,479

Amtrak operates passenger trains in the Northeast Corridor and on 37 other intercity routes serving a total of 45 states. The system carries less than 1 percent of intercity passenger traffic, however. Ridership has changed little since 1977, rising on average about 1 percent a year. In the same period, operating losses have risen 49 percent (nearly 10 percent in real terms), from $483 million in 1977 to $720 million in 1981. Fares and other nonfederal revenues covered only 42 percent of Amtrak's operating costs in 1981; federal appropriations covered the remainder. When allocated by route, the federal subsidy ranges from $12 per passenger on Northeast Corridor routes to more than $100 per passenger on several long-distance routes. Besides passenger subsidies, the federal government also provides all of Amtrak's capital funding--$177 million in 1981--and it has provided $2 billion for track and other improvements in the Northeast Corridor. Amtrak's operating costs and deficits have increased dramatically every year.

Amtrak's losses, and thus its federal subsidy, can be reduced substantially only by cutting routes. If the Amtrak system were limited to routes on which ridership is strongest and for which the prospects for improved ridership and better financial performance are greatest--in the Northeast Corridor, along part of the West Coast, and on certain routes around Chicago--the federal subsidy could come down by $1.5 billion over the 1983-1987 period. Limiting the system this drastically would maximize Amtrak's financial prospects, while shifting less than one-half of one percent of intercity passenger traffic to other modes. Additional federal savings could be gained by instituting new cost-sharing arrangements with state and local governments for the commuter-type service that Amtrak now operates in some areas, and by altering Amtrak's labor protection agreements to reduce the benefits available for displaced employees.

Three main arguments have been cited for reducing Amtrak's subsidy. First, the federal subsidy--roughly 23 cents per passenger mile in fiscal year 1980, or $50 per passenger, system-wide--already far exceeds the subsidies provided to other modes of transportation. Commercial aviation receives less than 1 cent per passenger mile in federal subsidies. The intercity bus industry, a more direct competitor with Amtrak in most areas, receives even less--approximately one-tenth of a cent per passenger mile. Results from ongoing Department of Transportation studies suggest that auto travelers pay their full federal costs through fuel and other user taxes.

Second, most Amtrak routes hold little or no promise for either significantly increased patronage or reduced costs, thus presenting continually increasing requirements for federal subsidies. Although ridership on some routes has surged during gasoline shortages, it has subsided quickly thereafter.

Third, little evidence supports arguments that the return on the federal investment in Amtrak, expressed in such terms as energy savings or transportation services to low-income persons, justifies the cost. Amtrak could save energy for the nation only if all service outside the Northeast Corridor were halted. Similarly, equity considerations are of little concern in reducing Amtrak's subsidies, because Amtrak does not carry a disproportionately high percentage of low-income passengers; buses serve far more low-income persons.

Arguments for maintaining the current Amtrak system include the fact that it provides reliable transportation to many areas that have no air service and where bus service is often subject to weather interruptions. Amtrak can play an important--albeit small--role in moving people during transportation emergencies arising from such events as acute oil shortages and labor strikes against other modes. Some of Amtrak's supporters also argue that ridership will increase substantially now that new equipment is operating and service has improved.

END MASS TRANSIT OPERATING SUBSIDIES
(A-400-b)

Savings from CBO Baseline	Annual Savings (millions of dollars)					Cumulative Five-Year Savings
	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	
Budget Authority	1,140	1,220	1,300	1,380	1,460	6,500
Outlays	1,030	1,210	1,290	1,370	1,450	6,350

The federal government provides operating assistance for virtually every local public transit system in the country, on average covering about 15 percent of operating costs. This aid, which began in 1975, will exceed $1 billion in 1982. If mass transit operating aid were withdrawn, savings in the next five years would total about $6.35 billion.

Three-fourths of the present operating aid is allocated by a formula that favors small and medium-sized cities; thus the federal subsidy per rider in these cities is disproportionately greater. These same recipient areas will therefore face more drastic fare increases or service cutbacks if the aid is ended. In absolute dollars, however, the largest urban areas would lose the most: New York, $193 million; Los Angeles, $84 million; Chicago, $74 million; Philadelphia, $47 million; Detroit, $32 million; San Francisco, $29 million; Boston, $26 million; and Washington, D.C., $25 million.

The main argument for ending these subsidies is that there is no rationale for imposing on national taxpayers the costs of operating local transit. The fare structures and benefits of these systems are the products of local decisions. Furthermore, federal aid may encourage inefficient operations, because it comes with statutory requirements that may inhibit innovation. For example, one provision now in effect requires that the aid not imperil the jobs of current workers, a constraint that may discourage innovative management techniques and efficiency measures.

Supporters of transit operating aid argue that state and local governments would have difficulty replacing these funds, and many systems would have to cut services or raise fares. The difficulty stems in part from the widespread practice of holding fare increases below cost increases. On average, today's transit rider pays about 45 percent of the operating costs; ten years ago, the riders' share was 80 percent. As a result, transit operators have been facing increasingly severe financial problems, even with federal aid. For example, in July 1981, Chicago increased its basic bus and subway fare by 10 cents to 90 cents, with a further increase of 10 cents budgeted for April 1982. If federal aid is eliminated for 1983, another 20 cents would be required.

Fare increases are almost certain to drive away transit riders--perhaps a 2 percent loss for every 10 percent increase in fares. Such an increase could pose special problems for low-income riders, few of whom have any alternate means of transport. Targeted aid might be a more effective way of helping those in need than subsidizing all riders, rich and poor alike.

REDUCE FEDERAL SHARE FOR MASS TRANSIT CAPITAL GRANTS (A-400-c)

Savings from CBO Baseline	Annual Savings (millions of dollars) 1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	Cumulative Five-Year Savings
Budget Authority	1,090	1,170	1,260	1,350	1,440	6,310
Outlays	120	290	560	820	1,110	2,900

For 1982, $2.5 billion in federal mass transit capital grants have been appropriated, including some $540 million available for transit in exchange for road segments withdrawn from the Interstate Highway System. This represents a cut of $660 million from 1981.

Only in the last decade has the federal government assumed a major role in financing local mass transit. At present, though, the federal government provides 80 percent of the cost of capital projects, with state and local governments covering the remainder. A change in this ratio to a 50-50 federal-state match would encourage state and local governments to apply more stringent economic criteria to mass transit investments. As a result, many projects would be greatly reduced in scale and complexity--or even eliminated--and federal spending for mass transit cut by 40 percent, saving $2.9 billion in outlays over the next five years. These funds would likely be replaced through some combination of increased state and local funding, decreased service, and increased fares. Some additional help would be provided through creative use of the 1981 tax law changes that permit tax-exempt public transit agencies to sell tax benefits to private firms; because of the revenue loss involved, however, this would offset some of the outlay savings.

Another option would be to end federal capital grants altogether, saving about $7 billion in outlays over the next five years. Although this change would force substantial readjustment, there is growing evidence that, in some situations, transit service can be provided more efficiently without federal aid and its attendant restrictions. For example, a number of suburban areas (Montgomery County in Maryland and parts of the San Diego suburbs in California are examples) are served more cheaply by bus operators, which receive no federal capital or operating aid. Savings are achieved by using lower-cost (largely nonunion) labor and by more effective use of capital--possibly smaller or older buses. Dramatic savings have already been achieved in some areas where local governments have had to cover all their mass transit capital expenses. San Diego, for example, recently completed an 18-mile light rail system in record time and for only $5 million a mile--about one-tenth the cost of similar systems sponsored by the federal government.

Ending capital grants, particularly if done on short notice, would be a severe measure. Some small and medium-sized cities that are not dependent on public transit would surely end their service. Larger cities would be forced to make dramatic reassessments of how they now provide transit services. Even if these changes--greater use of contracting out to the private sector, for example--resulted in more efficient transit services in the long run, the burdens of the transition would be difficult in the short term.

REFOCUS THE FEDERAL HIGHWAY PROGRAM
(A-400-d)

Savings from CBO Baseline	Annual Savings (millions of dollars) 1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	Cumulative Five-Year Savings
Budget Authority	4,730	4,900	5,120	5,330	5,570	25,650
Outlays	330	1,850	3,500	4,250	4,400	14,330

Federal and state governments have shared responsibility for financing construction of highways since 1916. Over the years, this partnership has grown to include more and more segments of the nation's road network. Federal participation now extends to the National System of Interstate and Defense Highways (at a cost of \$3.1 billion in 1982); primary state roads (at \$1.5 billion); secondary and urban roads (at \$1.2 billion); bridge replacement (at \$0.9 billion); and safety and miscellaneous other projects, such as bicycle paths and overseas highways. The federal government will spend \$8.3 billion on roads in 1982, and this sum will grow to \$11 billion by 1987 if current policies are continued.

Over the next five years, some \$14 billion in outlays could be saved by gradually limiting the federal highway program to its original emphasis on intercity arteries and the bridges they include. The largest savings would come from redefining the interstate system to include only projects that serve interstate commercial and passenger travel. At present, local routes and design modifications serving societal and environmental objectives cost more than half of the \$39 billion (in 1979 dollars) needed to complete the federally aided interstate plan. Returning financial responsibility for urban and secondary roads to state governments would account for \$5 billion of the projected \$14 billion in outlay savings over the next five years.

Alternatively, limiting federal highway construction funding to projects of interstate importance could permit the federal government to finance more of the maintenance costs of the growing interstate highway system. For example, the Administration has proposed some of the actions outlined above, along with an expanded interstate highway maintenance program that would be financed dollar for dollar from reductions in federal highway programs other than the interstate highway program. If this proposal were adopted, net budget savings would be smaller.

By withdrawing support from urban and local routes, the federal government would force substantially greater state and local expenditures for such roads, and many projects would be deferred or abandoned altogether. Cutting out urban interstate routes at this stage would break federal commitments made as long ago as 25 years. For this reason, legislative proposals to eliminate parts of the interstate system usually include some compensating increases for other activities, thereby diminishing the budgetary savings.

SHIFT AIRWAYS OPERATING COSTS TO THE AIRPORT
AND AIRWAYS TRUST FUND
(A-400-e)

Savings from CBO Baseline	Annual Savings (millions of dollars) 1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	Cumulative Five-Year Savings
Budget Authority	0	0	0	0	0	0
Outlays	0	0	0	0	0	0

The Airport and Airways Revenue Act of 1970 established the Airport and Airways Trust Fund, financed by user taxes on aviation fuel and passenger tickets. The Congress traditionally has restricted the use of these tax revenues to airport capital improvements and to cover part of the airways system's operating costs. Total costs in 1981 were $3.3 billion, of which $1.4 billion came from the trust fund and $1.9 billion from general revenues.

Because of the restricted use, receipts from aviation user fees have built up in the trust fund, accumulating a surplus of approximately $3 billion. Transferring all airways system operating costs to the trust fund would reduce the drain on general revenues by about $6.7 billion over the next five years, but the reduction would be offset by increased spending from the trust fund. There would be no effect on the federal deficit unless, for example, aviation user fees were increased to cover the associated costs now paid from general revenues (as described in B-400-a).

Restrictions on the purposes for which user fees can be spent stem from the view that general taxpayers benefit from the military and other "common-good" applications of the airways system, making it fair for general taxpayers to cover at least part of the system's costs. This argument is inconsistent with the operation of other federal trust funds, however. The highway trust fund is financed fully by highway users, despite any indirect defense or other benefits that nonusers might receive. Making the direct recipients of air services responsible for all related costs would encourage more efficient use of the aviation system. Some projects to expand airports or other aviation facilities might, in turn, be deferred or abandoned, offering the potential for additional savings.